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SUMMARY 
The quest to determine if non-human animals have emotional lives similar to man goes a long 
way back and is yet to result in a clear answer. The aim of this particular literature study is to 
determine whether or not the African elephant may host feelings of empathy and display 
altruistic behaviour. In search for an answer to this question, scientists have chosen to first 
evaluate the cognitive abilities of said species. They have done this through the testing of tool 
use, mirror self-recognition, memory and the ability to coordinate with another when 
performing a task etc. It is generally thought, that in order for complex emotion to exist within 
an individual, cognition, as an awareness of the self and others, must first be present. The 
African elephant has been found to perform at the same high level of cognition as chimpanzees.  
 
Empathy, although defined somewhat differently by different researchers, can be said to be the 
emotional state whereby an individual recognises and experiences the emotions of another. 
Probable evidence of empathy has been observed in both Asian and African elephants. For 
instance, consolation behaviour amongst Asian elephants in captivity and the apparent 
mourning of lost conspecifics seen amongst wild African elephants are strong indicators of such 
emotion. Also, the obvious, and to elephants unique, interest shown for the bones and ivory of 
their diseased, imply that elephant empathy is real. 
 
Altruism in elephants is more easily observed than empathy as it is a social behaviour directed 
outward towards another individual. The concept may be defined as: a selfless act (with or 
without risk for the performer) aimed at aiding another (related or non-related) individual in 
(perceived or actual) need. Variations of this behaviour have been thought to have been 
observed amongst African elephants. The attempts of a matriarch to help another, severely 
injured, unrelated matriarch is one example of such an act. Another is the removing of foreign 
objects, such as darts, spears, arrows or sharp branches, from the pierced body of a conspecific.  
 
In addition to behavioural studies, investigations of the neurological make up and internal 
communicational routes of the elephant brain have also been conducted. Despite their purpose 
not being the analysis of empathy and/or altruism specifically, the results of said studies may 
be discussed in relation to these concepts nonetheless. Empathy and altruism have in humans 
been found to occupy certain loci of the cerebellar cortex. This is interesting as the human 
cortex greatly resembles that of other mammals, elephants included, and the results might 
therefore be extrapolated onto other species. Furthermore, the elephant cortex has been shown 
to consist of a more intricate neuronal network, possibly potentiating a more delicate and rich 
signal transfer of emotions. 
 
In conclusion, there can be no firm conclusion. Empathy amongst African elephants is probable 
albeit not certain. As for altruism, the recorded examples of such behaviour performed by 
elephants are simply too few to provide a reliable answer. Further research is thus demanded. 
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SAMMANFATTNING 
Strävan efter ett svar på frågan om djur har känslor likt de hos människan har länge pågått och 
pågår än idag. Syftet med denna litteraturstudie är att undersöka och klargöra om empati och 
altruism går att återfinna hos den afrikanska elefanten. För att ge svar på denna fråga har 
vetenskapen ofta valt att först utvärdera den kognitiva förmågan hos denna art. Detta har gjorts 
genom tester av: om och hur väl verktyg används; om djuret känner igen sin egen spegelbild 
och kan samarbeta med andra för att klara av en uppgift; samt hur väl det kan minnas saker som 
skett för länge sedan. Det är inom beteendevetenskapen allmänt erkänt att kognition, definierat 
som förmågan att skilja på sig själv och andra, utgör grunden som komplexa känslotillstånd 
vilar på. Den afrikanska elefanten har i tester uppvisat en imponerande kognitiv förmåga 
motsvarande den hos schimpanser.  
 
Empati kan definieras som det emotionella tillstånd som innebär att ett djur eller en människa 
inte bara identifierar känslorna hos en annan individ, utan även sätter sig in i dessa och känner 
det den andra känner. Både afrikanska och asiatiska elefanter tros ha just denna förmåga. Till 
exempel så har man sett asiatiska elefanter i fångenskap tillsynes trösta varandra i stressfyllda 
situationer, och afrikanska elefanter i det vilda har observerats ge uttryck för vad som verkar 
vara sorg över förlusten av en artfrände. Studier har även visat att elefanter som ges tillgång till 
elfenben eller elefantkranier uppvisar ett unikt intresse för och beteende kring dessa objekt 
jämfört med andra liknande material.  
 
Altruism är ett utåtriktat socialt beteende med en tydlig utförare och en eller flera mottagare. 
Konceptet i sig kan definieras som: en osjälvisk handling (med eller utan risk för den 
handlande) med syfte att hjälpa en annan (med handlaren släkt eller icke släkt) individ som 
befinner sig i (verklig eller upplevd) nöd. Beteenden av denna sort tros ha setts utföras av 
afrikanska elefanter vid ett flertal tillfällen. Fallet med matriarken Eleanor som blev hjälpt av 
en obesläktad elefant efter att hon fallit och skadat sin snabel är ett exempel på en situation som 
sägs illustrera sann altruism. Även det flertalet gånger observerade beteendet då elefanter dragit 
ut bedövningspilar, spjut eller vassa grenar som spetsat en annan individ anses vara exempel på 
altruism. 
 
Utöver strikt beteendevetenskapliga studier så har även neurovetenskapen uppmärksammat 
unika drag hos den afrikanska elefanten. Bland annat så är det känt att elefanter har ett mer 
invecklad dentritiskt kommunikationsnätverk. Detta möjliggör en mer detaljerad 
signaltransduktion och därigenom kanske även ett rikare emotionellt spektrum. Undersökningar 
av den mänskliga hjärnans anatomi har visat att empati och altruism kan kopplas till specifika 
områden i hjärnbarken. Områden som troligtvis går att återfinna hos den afrikanska elefanten, 
vars hjärnbark är mycket lik den hos andra däggdjur. Ytterligare studier krävs dock för att veta 
detta med säkerhet. 
 
Sammanfattningsvis kan man dra slutsatsen att någon egentlig slutsats är svår att dra. Det är 
högst troligt, men inte helt otvivelaktigt, att empati går att återfinna hos afrikanska elefanter. 
Altruism, å andra sidan, präglas helt enkelt av en för invecklad definition och för få noterade 
exempel för att med vetenskaplig säkerhet kunna sägas existera hos denna art. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Background 
In recent years, scientific discoveries have been made advocating that some animals may have 
feelings much like those of man (Edgar et al., 2012). Even the more intricate emotions, such as 
empathy, are said to have developed well before the emergence of human kind (de Waal, 2008). 
Not all animals are ascribed the ability to feel empathy or other conscious emotional states, 
however. A certain level of cognition is commonly demanded (Dawkins, 2000). Monkeys, apes, 
dolphins, pigeons and rats have so far been ascribed a higher level of awareness and elephants, 
both African and Asian, have exhibited cognitive reasoning equivalent to that seen in primates 
(Byrne et al., 2009; Hampton, 2010). The debate of whether or not these animals 
consequentially feel empathy is however still ongoing. Often associated with empathy is the act 
of altruism. The existence of altruism amongst animals has only recently been verified and its 
role and evolutionary importance is yet to be fully understood (Cela-Conde et al., 2010; Bester 
& Güth, 1998; Kruger, 2003). 
 
Aim of Study 
The aim and strive of this literature study is to explore and clarify the debate of whether or not 
African elephants (the African bush Elephant Loxodonta africana and the African forest 
Elephant L. cyclotis) experience empathy. If so, can they display this outwardly through 
altruistic behaviour? Furthermore, I investigate if empathy is always followed by altruism and 
altruism always caused by motivational feelings of empathy or if perhaps one can exist without 
the other? In order to answer these questions I will examine how empathy and altruism have 
been defined throughout the history of science and to what extent human medical and 
behavioural research and its conclusions within these fields can be translated and applied to the 
animal kingdom. Likewise, I will investigate how studies performed on other animal species 
can be deciphered and applied to the African elephant. 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
To gather the information needed for the completion of this literature study I have spent most 
of my research time obtaining articles through Google Scholar and the databases available 
through SLU:s library and home page, e.g. PRIMO. I have attempted to search for data using 
both British and American spelling and/or phrasing. The words I have most frequently used to 
narrow down my field of research (here with British spelling) have been: African elephant, 
Loxodonta africana, Loxodonta cyclotis, empathy, empathic behaviour, altruism, altruistic 
behaviour, animal behaviour, animal cognition, cognitive behaviour, animal self-perception, 
and the like. 
 
Due to their phylogenetic closeness, studies of African and Asian elephants (Elephas maximus) 
are often treated as interdependently applicable and will thus be considered as such for this 
literature study as well (Plotnik & de Waal, 2014). This is also especially necessary for this 
particular paper as African elephants are seldom kept in captivity and therefore are difficult and 
expensive to study. Simply put, there is too little research done on wild African elephants within 
applicable fields. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Studies of cognition, empathy and altruism in animals 
There have been numerous studies investigating the possible existence of empathy and altruism 
within the animal kingdom. Not seldom have these studies also been studies of animal cognition 
as cognition is commonly deemed a prerequisite for empathic emotion and altruistic behaviour. 
Arguably, there can be no perception without self-awareness and thus one cannot have emotion 
without cognition (Gallese, 2003; de Waal, 2011).  
 
Cognition 
Cognition can be assessed in a variety of ways, and different species can be expected to display 
some but not necessarily all aspects of cognition and still be considered in possession of the so 
called “higher order brain functions” that are said to potentiate empathy and altruism (Hart et 
al., 2008; de Waal & Ferrari, 2010).  
 
Elephant cognition 
Tool use is widespread among animals and often tested as a tell-tale sign of higher levels of 
cognition (Hart et al., 2008; Byrne et al., 2009). However, tool use in itself need not necessarily 
be a reliable indicator of advanced cognition and instead, the active process of creating or 
manipulating tools for a certain purpose should be seen as significantly more complex and 
cognitively demanding. Only a few species known to man are capable of just such 
craftsmanship, elephants included (Hart et al., 2001; Hart et al., 2008; Byrne et al., 2009; 
Foerder et al., 2011).  
 
Elephants have also been tested to see if they demonstrate the ability to coordinate with each 
other by simultaneously pulling on a string to obtain a reward. Not only did elephants coordinate 
when given the choice, they also did not attempt to tug at the string if they were on their own, 
apparently knowing that this would have no effect (Plotnik et al., 2011). 
 
Mirror self-recognition is considered indicative of cognition and of higher forms of empathy 
and altruistic behaviour (Plotnik et al., 2006). The most classic test for this is the “mark test” 
when a spot is painted on the head or face of an animal that is then placed in front of a mirror. 
Any attempts to touch the spot by first recognising its position through use of the mirror 
indicates that the animal is able to both realise that the image in the mirror is in fact that of an 
animal and that the animal is them (Hart et al., 2008). Several studies of this kind have been 
conducted with elephants with both successful and less successful outcomes (Plotnik et al., 
2006; Hart et al., 2008; Nissani, 2008). In a mark test carried out by Plotnik et al. (2006) one 
out of the three elephants tested displayed the self-directed behaviour indicating self-awareness 
whilst the other two explored the mirror, attempted to look behind it and socially interact with 
the reflection but were seemingly unable to grasp that they were interacting with themselves. 
The results obtained through elephant studies correspond well to those of tested chimpanzees 
(Plotnik et al., 2006; Hart et al., 2008).  
 
Yet another strong indication of cognition is the ability to place and recall actions and events 
on a time line. In other words: the forming and retrieving of memories. When it comes to 
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memory (long-term, spatial, temporal and social), elephants outshine most animals with whom 
they have been compared (Hart et al., 2007; Markowitz et al., 1975). One great example, 
illustrating long-term, spatial and temporal memory in elephants, was recorded during the 
severe drought of 1993 in Tanzania. Older matriarchs were seen leading their clans out of the 
arid national park to search for water and forage, while groups led by younger matriarchs stayed 
put, and, as a result, lost many group members to famine and thirst. It was concluded that the 
older females must have had memories of how to survive previous droughts, whereas the 
younger females had no such experience to draw knowledge from (Foley et al., 2008). The 
capacity for long-term memory may be indicative of future planning and thus the forming of 
anticipation and expectations (de Waal & Ferrari, 2010). Social memory amongst elephants is 
highly sophisticated and allow individuals to discriminate between conspecifics and 
heterospecifics, relatives and non-relatives and friends and foes with great precision (Hart et 
al., 2008). 
 
Empathy 
To discuss the question of whether or not animals are capable of empathy and altruism one must 
first look at how these concepts have traditionally been described and defined. An exact and 
world renowned definition of empathy has yet to be established but most definitions of the term 
fall in close range of each other.  
 
Deutsch and Madle (1975) have somewhat paved the ground for subsequent definitions and 
described empathy as “the ability to understand and identify with the feelings and emotions of 
others… comprising both affective and cognitive components” (Cox et al., 2012). The most 
emphasised aspect here being the categorization of empathy into affective empathy (AE), and 
cognitive empathy (CE) (Edgar et al., 2012). Studies have shown that AE and CE occupy 
different loci in the brain and that balance or imbalance between the two, on an individual basis, 
can be directly correlated to connectivity between and dynamics within the regions of the brain 
involved in cognition, processing of emotions, mentalizing, interoception and autonomic 
monitoring (Cox et al., 2012). It may therefore be possible to feel affective empathy, defined 
as the ability to share the emotional experiences of others, while at the same time lack the 
cognitive empathy that enables an individual to take the mental perspective of others. This 
imbalance may go both ways (Cox et al., 2012). 
 
Another definition of empathy quite similar to that of Deutsch and Madle above defines the 
construct simply as a capacity for feeling the emotional dynamics of another’s current situation 
(Hoffman, 2000).  
 
Batson (2010), on the other hand, is careful to distinguish empathic concern, which he believes 
may induce altruistic motivation and behaviour, from several other uses of the term empathy 
that, at first glance, seem almost identical but due to subtle dissimilarities are not. Instead, most 
of the other terms are explained by Batson as cognitive or perceptual states that act as precursors 
to, or facilitators of, empathic concern. According to Batson (2010), empathic concern can be 
defined as “the other-oriented emotion elicited by and congruent with the perceived welfare of 
someone in need”. If taken apart, the definition becomes clearer. Congruent, in Batson’s words, 
refers to the valence of the empathic emotion meaning that a perceived positive emotion in an 
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observed other will evoke a positive empathic emotion within the observer, whilst a perceived 
negative emotion will conjure a mirrored negative such. Furthermore, the idea that the observed 
other is apparently in need, is, according to Batson, necessary for the empathic concern to 
trigger altruistic behaviour. The need of the other does not, however, have to be real but must 
be perceived as real by the observer. Batson also points out that empathic concern is any 
emotion felt by the observer for the observed. Thus, the appropriate psychological distinction 
is made by whose (perceived) welfare lies at the focus of the emotion as supposed to how the 
emotion is labelled (Batson, 2010).  
 
Elephants and empathy 
A manifestation of empathy may be the expression of consolation behaviour (Preston & de 
Waal, 2002). In a study of consolation amongst Asian elephants, distressed individuals referred 
to as “victims” were seemingly comforted by other elephants termed “bystanders” (Plotnik & 
de Waal, 2014). The bystanders were seen touching the face, mouth and genitals of the 
distressed animals while producing vocalizations of various sorts. The close proximity sound 
labelled as “chirping” (a sound used by elephants for reassurance) was heard. The consolation 
behaviour took place only after the “victim” had displayed signs of anxiety and their reactions 
were thereby not thought to be reactions to the distressing stimulus in itself. Because of the 
limitations of captivity, however, the animals were somewhat restricted in their social 
interactions and any conclusions as to how the consolation behaviour might differ, depending 
on degree of relationship between victim and bystander, could not be made with any degree of 
certainty (Plotnik & de Waal, 2014).  
 
Another expression of empathic emotion amongst elephants can be seen when the animals come 
across the remains of a diseased conspecific and show what is by some recognised as grief. 
Although the existence of explicit elephant graveyards has yet to be proven as something other 
than a coincidental gathering of bones (often near a water hole or some other place that elderly 
or sick individuals are hesitant to move away from), the behaviour elicited by these sites is 
highly predictable and unique to elephants compared to other non-human animals (Nicol, 
2013). The elephants will slowly approach, sniff at and touch the remains using their trunk and 
feet (Douglas-Hamilton et al., 2006). If the dead is only recently diseased, the elephants will 
sometimes attempt to push at or rock the body from side to side. On one occasion, investigators 
were able to monitor the travel of elephants from at least three unrelated families to the corpse 
of a diseased matriarch known as Eleanor, some visitors lingering by the body for hours and/or 
returning several times during the course of the study (Douglas-Hamilton et al., 2006). 
Elephants may also pick up and move dead individuals or partial remains. Mothers have been 
seen carrying the remains of their diseased calves draped over their tusks for days at an end 
before laying their bodies to rest. Elephants have also been discovered covering the corpses of 
deceased conspecifics with vegetation in a manner resembling human burial traditions (Hart et 
al., 2008).  
 
Furthermore, elephants have been proven able to distinguish ivory from other materials and 
elephant skulls from the skulls of other species. In a study conducted at the Amboseli National 
Park in Kenya, several separate elephant family groups were presented with dried, cleaned and 
bleached ivory amongst other correspondingly treated materials. Significantly more time was 
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spent investigating the ivory than the other materials. When the animals were in turn given 
skulls of elephant, buffalo and rhinoceros, the elephant skulls were inspected twice as long as 
the other and handled much like the natural remains described above (McComb et al., 2006). 
 
Altruism 
Altruism, similarly to empathy, is a term with which many have wrestled over the years, both 
regarding its measurability and its actual meaning. “True” altruism may simply be described as 
“altruism without obvious advantages for the actor” (de Waal & Ferrari, 2010). It is however 
often more intricately explained when dealt with in scientific studies.  
 
The aforementioned Batson (2010) declares that altruism is “a motivational state with the 
ultimate goal of increasing another’s welfare”. It is essentially the exact opposite of egoism 
whereby one strives to increase one’s own welfare (Batson, 2010). Just as with his definition 
of empathy, Batson’s idea of motivational altruism can be dissected for clarification. The 
motivational state Batson speaks of is a goal-directed motivation in which the individual desires 
a change and will only be fully satisfied when this change has taken place. The individual is, 
for lack of a better word, “drawn” towards this goal and will seek alternate solutions so as how 
to achieve set goal should obstacles arise (Batson, 2010). The fact that the ultimate goal is the 
increase of another’s welfare means that this is an end in itself as supposed to a means to an 
end. That being said, Batson does not exclude the possibility that the one performing the 
altruistic act may well obtain pleasure from this, only that this pleasure should be seen as a 
secondary consequence of reaching the goal for which motivation arose in the first place. 
Batson further stresses the distinction of his motivational altruism from what he refers to as 
helping behaviour. Due to a lack of obvious other-oriented motivation, helping behaviour is, in 
his opinion, merely when an individual acts in a way that benefits another without the reason 
necessarily being altruistic in nature (Batson, 2010).   
 
Altruism can be divided into evolutionary altruism and psychological altruism (Sober & 
Wilson, 1998; Batson, 2010). Evolutionary altruism proposes that the behaviour of an 
individual decreases the reproductive fitness of that individual whilst increasing the 
reproductive fitness of the individual(s) at the receiving end of the behaviour. Psychological 
altruism on the other hand, is altruism as Batson defines it: a goal-oriented motivational state 
with the aim of increasing another individuals welfare (Sober & Wilson, 1998; Batson, 2010) 
There need not necessarily be a connection between the two concepts and the self-sacrifice 
involved in evolutionary altruism is not a required aspect of psychological altruism. Therefore, 
an individual may very well act altruistically per definition, without needing to induce cost to 
self. Altruism is as follows not, as many assume, always evolutionary damaging to the 
performer (Batson, 2010).  
 
A slightly different description of what altruism entails is given by Trivers (1971) who describes 
what he labels reciprocal altruism as “behavior that benefits another organism, not closely 
related, while being apparently detrimental to the organism performing the behavior”. The 
benefit and detriment involved here being the gain or loss of inclusive fitness. Within the 
concept of inclusive fitness lies both direct and indirect fitness, meaning that the passing on of 
an individual’s genes may be through survival of that individual specifically, or the survival of 
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another carrier of said genes, such as a brother, sister, son or daughter. Through which of these 
paths the genes are inherited by the next generation is not important, simply that they in some 
way are (Hamilton, 1964a, 1964b). Trivers’ model dictates that it is the degree of relationship 
between two individuals that determine if a seemingly altruistic behaviour is in fact so or 
perhaps simply an expression of kin selection whereby the individual performing the behaviour 
is directly, or indirectly, attempting to protect their own genes. Therefore, altruistic behaviour 
between different species, such as that of interspecies cleaning among fish, ought to give 
undeniable evidence of reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971). Another good example of reciprocal 
altruism is the system of warning calls in birds. The fact that a warning call directly benefits 
neighbouring, but not necessarily related, birds more than it does the caller, may be what labels 
the behaviour itself as altruistic, but is of less importance when it comes to the behaviour’s 
survival over generations than the fact that it outcompetes groups where no warning calls are 
made at all. In areas where there is no warning that danger is approaching, natural selection will 
strike harshly and the “silent” birds of these areas will thus be selected against (Trivers, 1971). 
It is hence thought that this form of altruism has been favoured throughout evolution, 
specifically because it benefits the performer in the long run, despite this not having been the 
performer’s intention when deciding to act (Trivers, 1971). Reciprocal altruism could also be 
viewed as a symbiosis of sorts, where time plays a crucial role. After delivering a “helping 
hand”, the giver must wait in order to receive something in return. This demands a natural 
selection against individuals that are unwilling to return the favour such as fish who eat their 
cleaners or the “silent” birds discussed above (Trivers, 1971).  
 
The so called theory of social exchange postulates instead that each action performed in aid of 
another individual is accompanied by a silent but irrevocable condition that the action be repaid 
(Homans, 1958). The theory explains that social behaviour is nothing more than an exchange 
of goods and that these goods may be material ones, such as money, or non-material ones of a 
more symbolic value, such as love, status, approval and prestige (Homans, 1958; Cropanzano 
& Mitchell, 2005). The end result of these exchanges is in general a self-regulated balance 
between what has been given and what has been received. Exceptions to this rule may arise 
when individuals attempt to “cheat” and not repay what has been given. Those that do not 
comply are, however, very likely to be punished for their deviancy as reciprocity is, in most 
societies, a norm dictating how the members of said assembly should behave in order to fit in 
and be accepted (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). This is hence, similarly to Trivers’ model of 
reciprocal altruism, a matter of natural selection where compliance is favoured before 
deceitfulness. 
 
Elephants and altruism 
A case that well illustrates altruism amongst wild elephants is that of the injured elephant 
Eleanor, mentioned briefly under Elephants and empathy above (Douglas-Hamilton et al., 
2006). The matriarch Eleanor had fallen and badly injured her trunk while her clan was a great 
distance away. A matriarch, Grace, from a clan other than Eleanor’s was within minutes seen 
to approach the injured female and after carefully touching her body, lifted her onto her feet. 
When Eleanor came close to falling again, Grace supported and pushed her in an attempt to 
help her walk. This went on for some time and when Eleanor died the next day, Grace stayed 
by the body. Over the course of the next few days, more elephants gathered by Eleanor’s 
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remains and displayed what was perceived by the observers as compassion and grief (Douglas-
Hamilton et al., 2006).  
 
“Targeted empathic helping” is a term used by some to describe the frequently observed 
behaviour in African elephants towards disabled conspecifics (Hart et al., 2008). Numerous 
observations of elephants removing tranquilizing darts, spears or other foreign objects from 
another individual have strengthened the hypothesis that elephants do in fact recognise the need 
for help and are willing to provide it, regardless of the danger that handling of the foreign object 
may pose to the helper (Hart et al., 2008; Bates et al., 2008). 
 
Neurological studies 
Aside from observations of outwardly expressed characteristics, such as behaviour, studies 
investigating the anatomical structures and inner workings of the elephant brain have also been 
conducted with thought-provoking results. A study by Herculano-Houzel et al. (2014), found 
that the cerebral cortex of African elephants contained only one third of the number of neurons 
of that of the human cortex, despite measuring approximately twice the size. The group 
concluded that these findings validated the hypothesis that the superior cognitive abilities of 
man directly correspond to the greater total number of neurons present in the cortex of humans, 
compared to other species. A study challenging this view presents results that instead suggest 
that the cerebral cortex of African elephants constitutes a more complex interneuronal network 
than that of other mammals, and thereby potentiates a greater transfer of information with each 
reached action potential, allowing for “the emergence of greater behavioral sophistication” 
(Maseko et al., 2013). Which function that benefits from this complexity remains somewhat 
unclear, although speculations have been made regarding the infrasonic vocalisations and fine 
motor skills of the trunk (Maseko et al., 2013; Jacobs et al., 2014). 
 
Studies of brain structure in humans and primates have revealed that empathy and altruism can 
be directly linked to specific locations in the brain. One study documented that CE leads to 
activation of the inferior frontal gyrus, supramarginal gyrus and superior temporal sulcus, 
whilst AE instead activates the precentral gyrus, medial orbitofrontal cortex, insular cortex, 
brainstem, inferior parietal lobule and thalamus (Cox et al., 2012). It was also discovered that 
the release of oxytocin (a hormone involved in prosocial and caring behaviour) stimulates AE 
but not CE. Fieldman-Hall et al. (2015) have found that altruism, defined as empathically biased 
goal-directed behaviour, is anatomically located in the sgACC (subgenual anterior cingulate 
cortex), the caudate nucleus and the VTA (ventral tegmental area). These areas have for a long 
time been known to regulate emotion, learning, social behaviour and the reward system of the 
brain. The sgACC was, furthermore, noted as an important part of oxytocin release (Fieldman-
Hall et al., 2015).  
 
Pain, both personal and pain observed in another, leads to intense activity of the insular cortex 
(one of the locations of AE) as well as the sgACC and brainstem (two of the sites involved in 
altruism) (Singer et al., 2004). This knowledge has led to the conclusion that the sharing of 
another’s emotional state, i.e. empathy, occurs by means of activated “mirror neurons” (Gallese, 
2001; Bates et al., 2008). Empathy can thus be argued to pass “from body to body rather than 
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from mind to mind” in much the same way as with simple motoric mimicry (de Waal & Ferrari, 
2010). Others denote the existence of different kinds of “mirror neurons” and claim therefore 
that empathy is roused through the stimulation of affective neuronal signalling pathways, as 
supposed to motor pathways (de Vignemont & Singer, 2006). 
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DISCUSSION 
The greatest obstacle this report has been faced with has been the lack of consistency amongst 
the definitions of empathy and altruism. This dilemma is however not a new one but has always 
been and will always be until uniform definitions of the two constructs are made and accepted. 
Deutsch and Madle (1975) wrote as far back as 40 years ago: “While evidence of reliability for 
empathy measures is emerging, evidence for construct validity is not. Without information on 
construct validity, comparing the results from various studies is difficult, since the measures 
may not be assessing the same construct. The extent to which empathy measures actually 
assesses empathy, as opposed to other constructs, is a question that remains unanswered.”. I 
am, sadly, prone to agree and do recognise the possible flaws this may have led to in my 
conclusions. It is, furthermore, also important to note that regardless of the definition chosen, 
one must be aware that all concepts are social constructs influenced by culture, tradition and 
personal beliefs and that even a world renowned definition will be partial to interpretation.  
 
Cognition and empathy are, as stated above, often regarded as mutually exclusive. This is, I 
believe, quite a crude simplification of a not so simple matter. One could instead argue that 
cognition is not an ultimate requirement for empathy but simply what enables an individual to 
better process and understand said emotion (de Waal, 2011). Empathy could, in my opinion, in 
fact be said to exist within all animals living in groups where the survival of the species relies 
on strong social bonds and cooperation (de Waal, 2008). The concept has, as far as I know, yet 
to be ascribed to any species of solitary animals (Hampton, 2010; Edgar et al., 2012). The level 
of empathy present in different groups may however clearly vary (Bates et al., 2008). Therefore, 
to say that humans and some species of animals, such as elephants, experience a more 
sophisticated kind of empathy may in my opinion well be accurate. 
 
Empathy could be seen as the “emotional trigger” for choosing to act (Batson, 2010). Empathy 
does, however, not always have to lead to altruistic behaviour. When it does not, but could have 
(the ability being present), feelings of guilt and remorse may arise instead and so the possible 
second reason one may have had for acting (personal distress) is increased and the cost of not 
acting becomes greater than if one had acted. Fear of this anticipated guilt may thus drive 
altruism (de Waal, 2011). A recent study by Fieldman-Hall et al. (2015), has, however, 
concluded that an individual’s willingness to help is decided primarily by the individual’s trait 
levels of empathic concern and not by their trait levels of personal distress. 
 
Altruism is, I believe, seemingly rather straightforward. Altruism is a behaviour that an 
individual voluntarily chooses to perform in aid of another and it is indeed cognition that 
enables this active choice of action. However, there lies a certain danger in assuming that a 
particular behaviour is altruistic (and thereby consciously performed) as one can only observe 
the act itself and not the motivational force behind it. The inevitable risk of misinterpretation is 
the elephant in the room that is behavioural science. 
 
When referring to altruism one must clarify if one’s chosen definition describes an individual’s 
particular behaviour and its underlying motive (psychological altruism), or the reason for why 
the particular behaviour has survived throughout evolution (evolutionary altruism) (Sober & 
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Wilson, 1998). It would seem that psychological altruism may be either detrimental (such as 
receiving an injury when removing a foreign object from another) or neutral (such as the case 
of the injured matriarch Eleanor) to the performer and thereby damaging, inconsequential or 
even beneficial to the performer’s inclusive fitness. As put forward by de Waal and Ferrari 
(2010), the individual is not aware if the act may benefit him/her in the long run. The behaviour 
itself will, however, only be passed on to coming generations if it in some way benefits the 
direct or indirect fitness of the performer in accordance with the theory of Darwinism (Cela-
Conde et al., 2010; Kruger, 2003). Alas, I believe it is important to emphasise that the definition 
of altruism may differ despite describing one and the same act depending on the perspective 
from which the act is viewed. 
 
Altruism in elephants is in this way seemingly truly selfless when seen from the perspective of 
the performer but most probably beneficial when analysed from an evolutionary standing point. 
This being said, too little research has been done on wild elephants to indisputably demonstrate 
altruistic behaviour between non-relatives in accordance with Trivers’ (1971) more strict 
definition of the term. If another definition is used, however, altruism amongst elephants 
suddenly becomes evident and one could argue that: “Models that attempt to explain altruistic 
behaviour in terms of natural selection are models designed to take the altruism out of 
altruism” (Trivers, 1971).  
 
Several of the areas of the brain listed in the literature study above as areas of empathy and 
altruism, are located in the cortex (Cox et al., 2012; Fieldman-Hall et al., 2015). Although there 
have not yet been any dissections of similar sort and with similar aim performed on elephant 
brains, one could possibly still draw parallels from the studies. The elephant cerebellar cortex 
is in most part indistinguishable from the cortex of other mammals, with a few exceptions 
(Maseko et al., 2013; Jacobs et al., 2014). As previously stated, elephants are, for instance, in 
possession of a significantly greater dendritic complexity (Maseko et al., 2013). I would like to 
speculate that these intricate synapses perhaps not only enable the fine motor skills of the trunk 
and/or infrasonic speech, but also a broader emotional spectrum enveloping empathy and 
altruism? Based solely on the information to date, the possibility exists. A demand for further 
research is however advised in order to be able to say for certain. 
 
The role of oxytocin in empathic emotion and altruism has yet to be determined. Speculations 
could, however, be made, I believe, as to if this peptide is perhaps involved in some form of 
positive feed-back mechanism regulating empathy-based altruism. If oxytocin is released when 
an altruistic act is performed, as claimed by Fieldman-Hall et al. (2015), it is my belief that this 
consequentially ought to stimulate AE as proposed by Cox et al. (2012). The empathy felt for 
the individual at focus of the altruistic act should, logically, thereby increase. Could this mean 
that regardless of whether or not the provided help was motivated by empathy or something 
other, perhaps even egoism, a feeling of affective empathy will inevitably be felt? That an action 
benefitting someone else, without being selfless in nature, could in fact convert itself to true 
altruism and thereby turn the initially egoistic into an altruist? I do realise that these speculations 
are quite far-fetched and that they disagree somewhat with the idea that altruism follows 
empathy, and not the other way around. If a situation requires that an individual offers to help 
over an extended period of time, however, I do believe that this altruism-triggered empathy 
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could arise. This being said, the initial act of altruism could in such a case not be empathically 
motivated and may thus be argued to be false altruism. Once again, it all comes down to a 
choice of definition. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
It seems plausible, albeit not entirely certain, that African elephants feel empathy. The existence 
of elephant altruism, on the other hand, remains uncertain. Although instances of apparent 
altruism have been observed and both studies of cognition and brain composition tip the scales 
in favour of its existence, there are simply too few records of African elephants behaving 
altruistically in ways that cannot be explained by kin selection or inclusive fitness to provide a 
clear answer to this question. 
 
Empathy and altruism are not exclusively co-dependent. Empathy may elicit altruistic 
behaviour, and often does. However, an individual with the sufficient cognitive ability enabling 
them to act on their impulses may likewise decide to refrain from action. Also, depending on 
choice of definition, altruism need not always be selflessly motivated by empathic emotion. 
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